

Message Text

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EXDIS FROM UNA

FOLLOWING REPEAT ISLAMABAD 6931 ACTION SECSTATE INFO ANKARA
KABUL JIDDA LONDON MOSCOW NEW DELHI PARIS TEHRAN PEKING
JULY 17.

QUOTE: S E C R E T ISLAMABAD 6931

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PEPR, MARR, MASS, CENTO, SF, SD, US

SUBJECT: UNDER SECRETARY NEWSOM'S MFA DISCUSSIONS - 16 JULY

1. SUMMARY: DURING TWO-HOUR MEETING AT MFA JULY 16, MINISTER OF
STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AGHA SHAHI, IN A MORE THAN USUALLY FEISTY
MOOD, REPEATED FAMILIAR LITANY OF LACK OF US SUPPORT FOR PAKISTAN. HE
NOTED THAT IN FACE OF NEW REALITIES, INTERNATIONALLY AND IN THE
REGION, ONLY OPTION THAT NOW SEEMS OPEN TO PAKISTAN IS TO WITHDRAW FR
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CENTO. SUCH AN ACT WOULD STRENGTHEN PAKISTAN'S THIRD WORLD CREDENTIAL
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SINCE GOP CANNOT OBTAIN A VIABLE DEFENSIVE ESTABLISHMENT FROM THE
WEST, IT MUST DEPEND ON THE DIPLOMATIC, MORAL, AND POLITICAL SUPPORT
OF THE THIRD WORLD TO SURVIVE.

2. SHAHI ADDED THAT WITHDRAWAL FROM CENTO WOULD ALSO "APPEASE" THE
SOVIET UNION AND MAY BUT PAKISTAN SOME TIME. HE QUICKLY NOTED PAKISTA
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WOULD STILL WANT THE CLOSEST AND MOST CORDIAL TIES WITH US; THAT RELATIONSHIP SHOULD NOT BE AFFECTED BY PAKISTAN LEAVING CENTO. ALSO, OTHER THAN WITHDRAWAL FROM PACT, PAKISTAN WOULD NOT TAKE ANY OTHER ACTIONS TO "APPEASE" THE USSR. SHAHI WAS HIGHLY CRITICAL OF IRAN, SOMEWHAT LESS SO OF TURKEY, CLAIMING THAT NEITHER WAS WILLING GENUINELY TO HELP PAKISTAN.

3. UNDER SECRETARY NOTED WE WOULD BE WILLING TO TAKE VARIOUS STEPS TO ASSIST PAKISTAN IF REPROCESSING WERE PUT BEHIND US, AND OTHERS IN REGION WOULD ALSO HELP. SHAHI RESPONDED BRUSQUELY THAT IT IS POLITICALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO GIVE UP REPROCESSING PLANT. HE IMPLIED THAT EVEN IF GOP DID DO SO, THE ITEMS WE COULD OFFER, INCLUDING THE F-5E, WOULD BE INSUFFICIENT AND NOT HELP PAKISTAN BUILD A MODERN DEFENSIVE STRUCTURE. END SUMMARY.

4. UNDER SECRETARY NEWSOM MET WITH PAKISTAN MFA OFFICIALS JULY 16 FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION OF US/PAK BILATERAL RELATIONS. UNDER SECRETARY WAS ACCOMPANIED BY AMB HUMMEL. PAK SIDE LED BY MINISTER OF STATE AGHA SHAHI, ACCOMPANIED BY FOREIGN SECRETARY SHAHNAWAZ AND ADDITIONAL FOREIGN SECRETARY NAIK.

5. SHAHI OPENED WITH LONG, SOMBER, AND SOBER ANALYSIS OF US/PAK RELATIONS FROM THE MID-50S TO TODAY. HE RECITED THE FAMILIAR LITANY OF DECLINING US INTEREST IN SOUTH ASIA, LACK OF US CONCERN ABOUT INDIAN THREATS TO PAKISTANI INTEGRITY, US ARMS EMBARGOES, A RECENT
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ACCELERATION OF AMERICAN WITHDRAWAL FROM THE AREA, AND A GLOBAL "LACK OF RESOLVE". BECAUSE OF THIS "RADICAL CHANGE" IN US ATTITUDE, PAKISTAN HAS TO RETHINK ITS POLICIES.

6. SHAHI SAID PAKISTAN HAS SEVERAL OPTIONS, EACH OF WHICH HE HAS DISCUSSED SEVERAL TIMES WITH HIS IRANIAN AND TURKISH COUNTERPARTS. THE FIRST IS TO STRENGTHEN PAKISTAN THROUGH CENTO. THIS WOULD MEAN AN EXPLICIT DEFINITION OF GUARANTEES THE US WOULD OFFER IN THE FACE OF SOVIET THREAT BY PROXY THROUGH AFGHANISTAN AND/OR INDIA. IT WOULD NOT MEAN INVOLVEMENT OF US TROOPS, BUT WOULD INCLUDE ASSURANCES OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE.

7. THE MINISTER NOTED THAT NEITHER TURKEY NOR IRAN IS ABLE TO OFFER ANY HOPE THAT PAKISTAN COULD BE STRENGTHENED THROUGH CENTO. ALSO, IT IS GOP BELIEF THAT GIVEN CONGRESSIONAL AND PUBLIC ATTITUDES, USG IS UNABLE TO HELP PAKISTAN IN THIS MANNER.

8. A SECOND OPTION IS FOR PAKISTAN TO BUILD UP ITS DEFENSIVE CAPABILITY BY TURNING BILATERALLY TO ITS FRIENDS. IRAN SAYS IT CANNOT HELP BECAUSE OF FISCAL STRINGENCIES. TURKEY IS SIMILARLY UNABLE TO HELP.

SECRETARY VANCE HAS SAID THAT IF REPROCESSING IS NO LONGER AN IMPEDIMENT, WE WILL RESUME ECONOMIC AID AND SUPPLY MILITARY EQUIPMENT. SHAHI SAID IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR ANY PAKISTANI GOVERNMENT TO BACK OFF ON THE REPROCESSING ISSUE. EVEN IF IT WERE HYPOTHETICALLY POSSIBLE TO DO SO, THE GOP HAS CONCLUDED THAT THE US ARMS SALES POLICY PRECLUDES ANY HOPE THAT PAKISTAN CAN OBTAIN, WITH OUR HELP, A MODERN DEFENSIVE CAPABILITY. CHINESE DO WHAT THEY CAN, BUT THEY HAVE ONLY A LIMITED CAPABILITY. THEREFORE, SECOND OPTION IS ALSO OUT.

9. SHAHI SAID A THIRD OPTION GROWS OUT OF FACT THAT GOP IS UNDER SECRET

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CONTINUOUS AND INTENSE SOVIET PRESSURE. AFGHANISTAN AND INDIA WANT TO SEE A WEAK PAKISTAN. PAKISTAN DOES NOT HAVE A REAL PLACE IN US POLICY IN THE REGION, AND EVEN IF THE ADMINISTRATION WANTED TO HELP, IT CANNOT RUN THE GAUNTLET OF CONGRESSIONAL OBSTINACY. PAKISTAN MUST CONSEQUENTLY CONSIDER ACCEPTING A SITUATION IT CANNOT CHANGE. THE GOP REALIZES IF IT CANNOT OBTAIN A SUFFICIENT DEFENSIVE CAPABILITY, IT MUST STRENGTHEN ITS NON-ALIGNED CREDENTIALS. PAKISTAN MUST DEPEND ON DIPLOMATIC AND MORAL SUPPORT FROM THE THIRD WORLD IN PLACE OF A VAID DEFENSIVE ESTABLISHMENT, SINCE IT IS DENIED THE LATTER. THE KEY TO THIRD WORLD SUPPORT IS PAKISTAN'S DEPARTURE FROM CENTO.

10. SHAHI ADDED THAT A SECOND PURPOSE SERVED BY LEAVING CENTO IS THAT IT WOULD BE AN ACT OF "APPEASEMENT" TO THE SOVIET UNION WHICH MAY BUY THE GOP SOME TIME. THE MINISTER QUICKLY ADDED THAT GOP WOULD NOT TAKE ANY OTHER STEPS TO "APPEASE" THE USSR. PAKISTAN HOPES A DECISION TO LEAVE CENTO WOULD NOT AFFECT BILATERAL US/PAK TIES; PAKISTAN CONTINUES TO DESIRE THE CLOSEST COOPERATION BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. THUS CONNECTION IS "FUNDAMENTAL AND BASIC" AND REMAINS CRITICALLY IMPORTANT TO PAKISTAN. THE GOP DOES NOT WANT TO SEE THAT TIE WEAKENED SINCE THE RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE PRC AND THE US FORM THE FOUNDATION OF PAKISTAN'S FOREIGN POLICY.

1. SHAHI SAID THAT HIGH-LEVEL MISSION TO MOSCOW LATER THIS MONTH, LET BY SENIOR MINISTER GHULAM ISHAQ, WOULD NOT REPORT NOT DISCUSS PAKISTANI WITHDRAWAL FROM CENTO WITH THE SOVIETS. MISSION IS AN ECONOMIC ONE, AND ISHAQ WILL ASK FOR FURTHER SOVIET SUPPORT FOR THE STEEL MILL (CHARACTERIZED SECRET

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BY SHAHI AS "A LARGE WHITE ELEPHANT, BUT ONE WE CANNOT GET RID OF"). PAKISTAN IS A PROUD STATE AND WILL NOT BOW TO IMMEDIATE AND DIRECT SOVIET PRESSURES. TO DISCUSS LEAVING CENTO NOW TITHE THE USSR WOULD BE READ AS JUST SUCH A CAPITULATION.

12. GOP HAS TOLD IRAN AND TURKEY IT WOULD BE WILLING TO SIGN BILATERAL MILITARY ALLIANCES WITH BOTH COUNTRIES TO REPLACE THE CENTO LINK. GOP WOULD MAKE SAME OFFER TO USG. HOWEVER, PAKISTAN MUST LEAVE CENTO IF IT WANTS TO BECOME FULL AND BONA FIDE MEMBER OF THIRD WORLD AND GAIN THE CONSEQUENT DIPLOMATIC AND POLITICAL SUPPORT.

13. THE UNDER SECRETARY NOTED HE WANTED TO CLARIFY SEVERAL POINTS. THE SHAH HAD SAID IRAN IS PREPARED TO HELP PAKISTAN ACQUIRE MILITARY DEFENSIVE EQUIPMENT FROM THE US OR OTHER SOURCES, ONCE THE REPROCESSING ISSUE IS BEHIND US. IT IS THEREFORE NOT CORRECT TO CHARACTERIZE THE IRANIANS AS UNWILLING TO HELP.

14. MORE GENERALLY, IF THE REPROCESSING ISSUE IS OVERCOME, WE CAN DISCUSS SPECIFIC PROCUREMENT OF MILITARY ITEMS FROM THE US. POSSIBLY FRANCE MAY ALSO BE PREPARED TO HELP; IRAN AND SAUDI ARABIA COULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE FINANCING FOR THE EQUIPMENT. IN RESPONSE TO SPECIFIC QUERY, THE UNDER SECRETARY NOTED WE WOULD AGREE TO SELL PAKISTAN F-5E OR EQUIVALENT INTERCEPTOR AIRCRAFT, HOWITZERS, AND OTHER EQUIPMENT. SHAHI RESPONDED THAT PAKISTAN IS AWARE THE US WOULD PROBABLY SELL THE F-5E AND HAD BEEN TOLD SO EVEN BEFORE THE GLENN AMENDMENT CAME INTO EFFECT. SO THIS DOES NOT REPRESENT A REAL STEP FORWARD; IN FACT.. SINCE THE US IS STILL UNWILLING TO SELL THE A-10 IT CAN EVEN BE TERMED RETROGRESSIVE.

15. THE UNDER SECRETARY NOTED THAT WE APPRECIATE THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES INVOLVED IN CANCELLATION OF THE REPROCESSING CONTRACT. HOWEVER, A FORMAL RENUN-
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CANCELLATION IS NOT REQUIRED. WHAT WE NEED IS A STATEMENT THAT THE PROJECT HAS BEEN SUSPENDED. SHAHI CONFINED

HIMSELF TO REITERATING THE POLITICAL IMPOSSIBILITY OF SUCH AN ACT.
16. IN RESPONSE TO A QUERY WHAT GOP WOULD GAIN BY MOVING CLOSER TO USSR, SHAHI RESPONDED THAT PAKISTAN WOULD MOVE CLOSER TO THIRD WORLD, NOT THE USSR, BY LEAVING CENTO. CENTO DOES NOT OFFER ANY SECURITY. THE US CANNOT OFFER SECURITY. "WE ARE IN DESPAIR OVER

THE US. YOU CANNOT EVEN GIVE US SUFFICIENT HELP TO OPPOSE A SOVIE SURROGATE".

17. UNDER SECRETARY ASKED IF APPEASEMENT OF SOVIET UNION MEANS GETTING USSR TO ACCEPT DURAND LINE. SHAHI ANSWERED THAT HE DOES NOT KNOW. HOWEVER, GOP BELIEVES THAT IF YOU HAVE A SUPERPOWER ON YOUR BORDER, IT PROBABLY WILL NOT TOLERATE YOUR MEMBERSHIP IN A PACT DIRECTED SPECIFICALLY AGAINST IT.

18. THE UNDER SECRETARY CLOSED BY NOTING THE DANGERS OF FALLING PREY TO THE MYTH OF SOVIET OMNIPOTENCE. ALTHOUGH THEY HAVE MADE GAINS, THEY HAVE SUFFERED REVERSALS ELSEWHERE. OUR RESOLVE AND WILLINGNESS TO HELP REMAIN STRONG, JUST AS OUR CONCERN FOR AND DEEP INTEREST IN THE SECURITY AND STABILITY OF THE REGION AND PAKISTAN REMAIN UNDILUTED. HUMMEL UNQUOTE CHRISTOPHER

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